Bennett v. Conrail Matched Sav by unknown
1999 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
2-23-1999 
Bennett v. Conrail Matched Sav 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_1999 
Recommended Citation 
"Bennett v. Conrail Matched Sav" (1999). 1999 Decisions. 43. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_1999/43 
This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 1999 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. 
Filed February 23, 1999 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 




STEVEN W. BENNETT; EDMUND L. GILLOOLEY; 
JOSEPH L. ALESSANDRINI, JR.; FRANK W. HEWITT; 
RICHARD E. SEMARAD; WARREN E. KAYLOR, 




CONRAIL MATCHED SAVINGS PLAN ADMINISTRATIVE 
COMMITTEE; DEBORAH A. MELNYK; JOHN/JANE DOES 
1-10; CONSOLIDATED RAIL CORPORATION MATCHED 
SAVINGS PLAN 
 
       Steven W. Bennett; Edmund L. Gillooley; 
       Joseph L. Alessandrini, Jr.; Frank W. Hewitt; 
       Richard E. Semarad; Warren E. Kaylor, 
       Individually and on behalf of all members of the 
       proposed class, 
 
       Appellants in 97-1916. 
 





CONRAIL MATCHED SAVINGS PLAN ADMINISTRATIVE 
COMMITTEE; DEBORAH A. MELNYK; JOHN/JANE DOES 
1-10; CONSOLIDATED RAIL CORPORATION MATCHED 
SAVINGS PLAN 
 
       Joanne Kelly, 
 




GEORGE E. GALE, III, Individually and on behalf of all 
others similarly situated, 
 




CONRAIL MATCHED SAVINGS PLAN ADMINISTRATIVE 
COMMITTEE; DEBORAH A. MELNYK; JOHN/JANE DOES 
1-10; CONSOLIDATED RAIL CORPORATION MATCHED 
SAVINGS PLAN 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil Action Nos. 97-cv-04535; 05017 & 05345) 
District Judge: Honorable Harvey Bartle, III 
 
Argued July 13, 1998 
 
Before: SLOVITER and ROTH, Circuit Judges 
FEIKENS,1 District Judge  
 
(Opinion filed February 23, 1999) 
 
       Alan M. Sandals, Esquire (Argued) 
       Howard I. Langer, Esquire 
       Sandals, Langer & Taylor, LLP 
       1650 Market Street 
       One Liberty Place, 47th Floor 
       Philadelphia, PA 19103 
 
        Attorney for Appellants Bennett, 
        Gillooley, Alessandrini, Hewitt, 
        Semarad and Kaylor 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. The Honorable John Feikens, United States District Court Judge for 
the Eastern District of Michigan, sitting by designation. 
 
                                2 
  
       Kenneth I. Trujillo, Esquire 
       Ira Neil Richards, Esquire 
       Trujillo, Rodriguez & Richards, LLC 
       226 West Rittenhouse Square 
       The Penthouse 
       Philadelphia, PA 19103 
 
        Attorneys for Appellants 
        Kelly, et al. 
 
       David Berger, Esquire 
       Harold Berger, Esquire 
       Stanley R. Wolfe, Esquire 
       Patricia D. Gugin, Esquire 
       Berger & Montague, P.C. 
       1622 Locust Street 
       Philadelphia, PA 19103 
 
        Attorneys for Appellants 
        Gale, et al. 
 
       Laurence Z. Shiekman, Esquire 
        (Argued) 
       Brian T. Ortelere, Esquire 
       Pepper Hamilton LLP 
       18th & Arch Streets 
       3000 Two Logan Square 
       Philadelphia, PA 19103-2799 
 
        Attorneys for Appellees 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
ROTH, Circuit Judge: 
 
Appellants are former employees of Conrail Corporation. 
They challenge the distribution of surplus assets of an 
employee stock ownership plan ("ESOP" or the "Plan"). The 
Plan is governed by the Employee Retirement Income 
Securities Act ("ERISA"). We must decide whether ERISA 
entitled the former employees to a portion of the cash 
surplus in the Plan that resulted from a favorable tender 
offer for Conrail's stock. Appellants argue that under ERISA 
they are entitled to share in the surplus and that Conrail's 
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failure to permit them to do so violates fiduciary duties 
imposed by ERISA. We conclude that appellants were not 
entitled to participate in the apportionment of the surplus 




In 1990, Conrail established a voluntary savings plan for 
non-union employees. The Plan was a defined contribution 
plan2 and included an employee stock ownership plan and 
a deferred compensation plan. To get established, the Plan 
borrowed $290 million from Conrail to purchase a specially 
created class of Conrail preferred stock. This stock was 
held in an unallocated account. Participating employees 
contributed a portion of their salary into individual 
accounts and Conrail matched these contributions with 
stock from the unallocated account. These contributions 
vested immediately. Under the Plan, "all amounts allocated 
to the Account of a Participant shall be fully vested and 
nonforfeitable at all times." Conrail Plan Agreement, P 12.1. 
The benefits, which accrued under the defined contribution 
plan, were based solely on the performance of the shares in 
the individual accounts. As the District Court noted, the 
benefits depended on the vagaries of the marketplace. 
 
Shortly after establishing the Plan, Conrail began to 
terminate employees. A terminated employee was entitled 
"to a distribution of all amounts credited to his account." 
Conrail Plan Agreement, P 8.1. Appellants do not dispute 
that they were fully vested and that, when they were 
terminated by Conrail, they were credited with the total 
vested balance in their individual accounts. 
 
In 1997, Norfolk Southern and CSX Corporations made a 
favorable tender offer to purchase Conrail. The tender offer 
was for all outstanding shares of Conrail stock, including 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. In a defined contribution plan "employees are not promised any 
particular level of benefits; instead they are promised only that they 
will 
receive the balance in their individual accounts." Pension Benefit Guar. 
Corp. v. LTV Corp., 496 U.S. 633, 637 n.1 (1990). This is in contrast to 
a defined benefit plan which provides a fixed benefit to the employee. 29 
U.S.C. S 1002(35). 
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shares held in the unallocated account. The price Norfolk 
Southern and CSX paid for the stock was substantially in 
excess of its market value. After the Plan repaid Conrail the 
funds which it had borrowed to establish the Plan, the 
Plan's share of the proceeds from the tender offer resulted 
in a cash surplus of approximately $533 million in the 
unallocated account. 
 
In June 1997, the Plan was amended to allocate this 
surplus to persons employed by Conrail from 1996-1998.3 
The amendment provided that these allocations would be 
made to the maximum extent allowed under the Internal 
Revenue Code (either $30,000 or 25% of annual 
compensation for the eligible employee, whichever is less). 
Employees terminated or otherwise separated from 
employment with Conrail before 1996 were not eligible to 
share in the surplus. Appellants are among this ineligible 
group. 
 
Appellants brought suit in the U.S. District Court for the 
Eastern District of Pennsylvania, alleging two counts of 
ERISA violations. The District Court concluded that 
appellants received their accrued benefits as mandated by 
ERISA and for that reason they were not entitled to share 
in the surplus. The District Court dismissed both counts 
for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6). This appeal 
followed. 
 
II. JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
 
The District Court had jurisdiction over this action based 
on 28 U.S.C. S 1331 and 29 U.S.C. S 1132(e). We have 
jurisdiction over the appeal of the dismissal pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. S 1291. We review a dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) 
under a plenary standard of review. Malia v. General 
Electric Co., 23 F.3d 828, 830 (3d Cir. 1994). 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. Under the Plan, Conrail's Board of Directors could "amend or 
terminate, in whole or in part, the Plan . . . at any time and in any 
manner, without prior notification. . . . no amendment to the Plan shall 
decrease a Participant's benefit or eliminate an optional form of 
distribution. No amendment shall make it possible for any assets of the 
Plan to be used for or diverted to any purpose other than for the 
exclusive benefit of Participants and Beneficiaries." Plan at P 14.1. 
 




Appellants' complaint set forth two counts, alleging 
violations of ERISA. First, they claim that Conrail violated 
ERISA and tax code provisions governing partial and 
complete termination of pension plans. In the second 
count, they allege that under ERISA, Conrail breached its 
fiduciary duty by amending the Plan to adopt an 
inequitable distribution scheme. Appellants contend that on 
its termination, the Plan was essentially a "wasting trust" 
and therefore Conrail had a duty to distribute all its assets 
equitably. 
 
A. Partial Termination 
 
We turn first to appellants' claim that a partial 
termination occurred and that the partial termination 
mandated distribution of a share of the unallocated assets 
to appellants. Appellants contend that the Plan was 
partially terminated when in 1990, shortly after Conrail had 
established it, Conrail started laying off employees. 
Appellants argue that, under the Internal Revenue Code, a 
partial termination requires the distribution of unallocated 
Plan assets to the terminated employees. 26 U.S.C. 
S 411(d)(3). 
 
The District Court assumed that the employees were 
correct in contending that the layoffs constituted a partial 
termination of the Plan. This assumption is consistent with 
our conclusion in Gluck v. Unisys Corp., 960 F.2d 1168, 
1183 (3d Cir. 1992), that "partial termination...involves a 
significant reduction in plan liability by means of a 
corresponding reduction in employee benefits. That 
reduction may be achieved either by excluding a segment of 
employees, or by reducing benefits generally." Since we 
have found that excluding employees through layoffs is a 
"vertical partial termination," id., the District Court 
reasonably assumed that a partial termination had 
occurred. 
 
This conclusion does not, however, help appellants. Even 
though a partial termination of the Plan may have 
occurred, the tax code does not afford the appellants the 
relief they seek. Appellants argue that the Internal Revenue 
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Code requires any partially terminated tax-qualified 
pension plan to distribute benefits to all "affected 
employees." They cite to 26 U.S.C. S 411(d)(3), which 
provides that a plan will retain its tax qualified status if 
 
       upon its termination or partial termination . . . the 
       rights of all affected employees to benefits accrued to 
       the date of such termination, partial termination, or 
       discontinuance, to the extent funded as of such date, 
       or the amounts credited to the employees' accounts are 
       nonforfeitable. 
 
Appellants' reliance on this section is, however, 
misplaced. Section 411(d)(3) refers only to "benefits 
accrued." The code defines "benefits accrued" for defined 
contribution plans as the balance in the individual's 
account. 26 U.S.C. S 411(a)(7)(A)(ii).4 In addition, as 
S 411(d)(3) makes clear, affected employees are entitled to 
"benefits accrued to the date of such termination, [or] 
partial termination." Appellants were fully vested in the 
balance in their accounts when they were laid off, but their 
contributions to the Plan ceased at that time. The Plan 
would not reopen as to them to gather in further assets to 
accrue for their benefit. Indeed, by the express language of 
the Plan, only participants having a base salary earned for 
services could contribute to the Plan. Plan Agreement, P 3.1 
and p. 3. For that reason, after their lay-off, appellants 
were no longer entitled to receive new benefits in the Plan. 
 
Moreover, appellants are conflating accrued benefits with 
plan assets. Assets and benefits are treated differently 
under ERISA. As we noted in Malia: 
 
       "benefits" are elements that are conceptualized and 
       treated differently in a plan termination than are 
       "assets" of that plan. "Benefits" are computed in a 
       different manner than "assets." Accrued benefits are 
       placed on the liability side, rather than on the asset 
       side of the balance sheet. 
 
23 F.3d at 832. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. ERISA also defines "accrued benefit" as the balance of an individual's 
account. 29 U.S.C. S 1002(23)(B). 
 
                                7 
  
In Malia, two pension plans merged resulting in surplus 
assets. Participants sued to receive the surplus in addition 
to their benefits under the defined benefit plan. In 
upholding the dismissal of the employees' claims, we held 
that assets and benefits are distinct. Unallocated assets are 
not the same as accrued benefits. ERISA protects only 
anticipated benefits, not surplus assets. 
 
We came to a similar conclusion in Chait v. Bernstein, 
835 F.2d 1017 (3d Cir. 1987), where, in considering the 
applicability of S 411(d)(3) of the tax code to a claim for 
surplus assets after a partial termination of an employee 
benefit plan, we held that "the purposes and policies of 
partial terminations under the tax code do not apply in the 
context of vested employees attempting to gain plan 
surplus." Id. at 1021. 
 
The appellants argue, however, that Treasury Regulation 
S 1.411(d)-2(a)(2)(i) supports their position that they are 
entitled to their share of the surplus. This regulation 
provides that, in order for a plan to remain a tax qualified 
one upon partial termination, unallocated funds must be 
allocated to covered employees: 
 
       (2) Required allocation. (i) A plan is not a qualified plan 
       . . . unless the plan provides for the allocation of any 
       previously unallocated funds to the employees covered 
       by the plan upon termination or partial termination of 
       the plan . . .. 
 
Treas. Reg. S 1.411(d)-2(a)(2)(i). As the District Court 
pointed out, however, this regulation does not "require the 
allocation of amounts to the account of any employee if 
such amounts are not required to be used to satisfy the 
liabilities with respect to employees and their beneficiaries 
under the plan." Treas. Reg. S 1.411(d)-2(a)(2)(iii). 
 
The question then is whether the accumulation of a 
surplus in a plan may properly be considered an 
outstanding liability of that plan. We conclude that it 
should not be so considered. As we determined in Malia, 
accrued benefits are liabilities of a plan; assets (such as 
surplus) fall on the other side, the asset side, of the balance 
sheet. See 23 F.3d at 832. 
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Nevertheless, appellants argue that, since the Plan 
contains no employer reversion provision, there is nowhere 
for the surplus to go but to them.5 For this reason, they 
contend, distribution of the surplus must be considered an 
outstanding liability. While appealing in its simplicity, this 
"by process of elimination argument" fails because, as we 
have pointed out, benefits are a liability of a plan; assets 
are not. 
 
We conclude, therefore, that both under the relevant 
portions of the tax code and under the applicable treasury 
regulations, appellants are not entitled to share in the 
surplus upon partial termination of the Plan. 
 
Appellants next urge that Conrail's failure to distribute 
surplus assets to them upon partial termination of the Plan 
constituted a breach of the duties imposed by ERISA. Their 
first argument relies on 29 U.S.C. S 1344 (S 4044 of ERISA). 
They contend that S 1344 requires that, upon termination, 
plan assets be distributed equitably. However, S 1344 
applies to the partial termination of a plan only when the 
plan provides that it do so. Ashenbaugh v. Crucible Inc., 
1975 Salaried Retirement Plan, 854 F.2d 1516, 1529 n.15 
(3d Cir. 1988). The Conrail Plan does not so provide. 
Therefore, appellants' argument that S 1344 should apply to 
this partially terminated plan is unavailing. 
 
Finally, appellants argue that the distribution scheme 
simply is unfair. They contend that they assumed the risk 
of the market performance of the Conrail stock throughout 
their tenure at Conrail and now they are being excluded 
when it comes time to realize the reward of its increase in 
value. However, ERISA does not confer substantive rights 
on employees; rather it ensures that they will receive those 
benefits that the employers have guaranteed to them. See 
Hughes Aircraft Co. v. Jacobson, No. 97-1287, 1999 WL 
24546, at *6 (U.S. Jan. 25, 1999). As we stated in Malia: 
 
       ERISA provides for comprehensive federal regulation of 
       employee pension plans . . . . [T]he major concern of 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. Typically, defined contribution plans do not include a provision for 
reversion to the employer. See H.R. Conf. Rpt. No. 841, 99th Cong., 2d 
Sess. at Vol. II-482 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4078, 4570. 
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       Congress was to ensure that bona fide employees with 
       long years of employment and contributions realize 
       anticipated pension benefits. 
 
23 F.3d at 830, quoting, Reuther v. Trustees of Trucking 
Employees of Passaic and Bergen County Welfare Fund, 575 
F.2d 1074, 1076-77 (3d Cir. 1978). While ERISA provides 
that a fiduciary must act "(A) for the exclusive purpose of: 
(i) providing benefits to participants and their beneficiaries;" 
29 U.S.C. S 1104(a)(1)(A), ERISA does no more than protect 
the benefits which are due to an employee under a plan. 
 
It is true that appellants' level of benefits was contingent 
on the performance of Conrail securities purchased for their 
individual accounts, based on their level of contribution. As 
the value of those securities went up, so did the value of 
their accounts. Accordingly, appellants realized the increase 
in value of those securities while appellants were 
participants in the Plan. However, ERISA only guarantees 
them the level of the benefits accrued up to the time of 
their termination by Conrail. For this reason, the windfall, 
from which they claim they were excluded, was not one to 
which they were entitled. 
 
Moreover, appellants overstate the magnitude of the so- 
called windfall. The distribution of the cash surplus can 
only be made up to the limit allowed by the tax code. This 
is the lesser of 25% of an employee's salary or $30,000. 
Since many of the employees who receive this "windfall" will 
lose their jobs as a result of the CSX-Norfolk Southern 
takeover, the amount of their windfall hardly seems 
inequitable. 
 
Even if we conclude then that a partial termination did 
occur as a result of the layoffs at Conrail, ERISA protects 
only accrued benefits. These were credited to appellants in 
the form of the balance of the individual accounts 
guaranteed to appellants when they were laid off. 
Appellants are not entitled to the surplus that resulted from 
the tender offer. 
 
B. Complete Termination of the Plan and 
       Application of S 1344 
 
We now turn to the application of 29 U.S.C. S 1344 to a 
complete termination of the Plan. Appellants assert that, 
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even if no partial termination occurred, they were entitled 
to share in the surplus when Conrail completely terminated 
the Plan in May 1997. They argue that S 1344(d) governs 
the distribution of residual assets when a plan is 
terminated and that, pursuant to its language, former 
employees should share in the surplus. 
 
Appellants point out that ERISA directs that a plan 
termination be conducted according to the procedure set 
forth in S 1344. Section 1103(d) provides that "[u]pon 
termination of a pension plan . . . the assets of the plan 
shall be allocated in accordance with the provisions of 
section 1344 . . .." 29 U.S.C. S 1103(d)(1). Section 
1103(d)(2) further provides that a plan's assets shall be 
distributed "in accordance with the terms of the plan." 
 
Section 1344(d) regulates the distribution of residual 
assets to the employer after the satisfaction of all liabilities 
to plan participants. It reads in part: 
 
       (1) Subject to paragraph (3), any residual assets of a 
       single-employer plan may be distributed to the 
       employer if-- 
 
       (A) all liabilities of the plan to participants and their 
       beneficiaries have been satisfied, 
 
       (B) the distribution does not contravene any 
       provision of law, and 
 
       (C) the plan provides for such distribution in these 
       circumstances. 
 
       * * * 
 
       (3)(A) Before any distribution from a plan pursuant 
       to paragraph (1), if any assets of the plan 
       attributable to employee contributions remain after 
       satisfaction of all liabilities described in subsection 
       (a) of this section, such remaining assets shall be 
       equitably distributed to the participants who made 
       such contributions or their beneficiaries (including 
       alternate payees, within the meaning of section 
       1056(d)(3)-(K)) of this title. 
 
29 U.S.C. S 1344(d) (emphasis added). 
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Appellants are correct that ERISA directs that a plan 
termination be conducted in accord with S 1344 and that 
S 1344(d) governs the distribution of residual assets. 
Appellants argue that, since ERISA defines "participants" to 
include employees and former employees, 29 U.S.C. 
S1002(7), appellants should be included in the allocation 
described in S 1344(d). The plain language ofS 1344(d), 
however, proves the error of their argument. Section 
1344(d) applies only when an employer is seeking a 
reversion of assets to itself. 29 U.S.C. S 1344(d)(3)(A). That 
is not the case here. Appellants concede that the Plan 
contains no employer reversion provision. In addition, 
S 1344(d) refers to the distribution of residual assets 
"attributable to employee contributions." This case, 
however, involves the distribution to participants of a 
surplus resulting from a favorable tender offer, not a 
distribution of the remainder of their contributions. For 
these reasons, we conclude that S 1344 does not entitle 
appellants to a share of the surplus assets. 
 
Finally, appellants argue that in amending the Plan to 
create the distribution scheme now under attack, Conrail 
violated its fiduciary duties to act with loyalty and 
impartiality. ERISA basically requires that fiduciaries 
comply with the plan as written unless it is inconsistent 
with ERISA. 29 U.S.C. S 1104(1)(D). Chait v. Bernstein, 835 
F.2d 1017 (3d Cir. 1987) (receiver who took over 
management of corporation that contributed to plan did not 
self-deal when he terminated the plan in accord with 
ERISA.) Essentially, appellants claim that Conrail's actions 
inure to the benefit of management and to the exclusion of 
plan participants in direct contravention of ERISA. Because 
we find that appellants are not entitled to any of the 
surplus either upon partial termination or complete 
termination, we find appellants lack standing to challenge 
the manner in which that surplus is ultimately distributed. 
In short, they are not harmed by the distribution scheme.6 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. Since appellants lack standing to challenge the distribution scheme, 
we will take no position at this time whether the scheme is in accord 
with ERISA. 
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C. Fiduciary Duty  
 
The second count of the dismissed complaint makes a 
claim of breach of fiduciary duty by Conrail. Appellants 
argue that, when terminated, the Plan became a "wasting 
trust"7 and as a consequence Conrail had an obligation 
under common law to distribute all the assets equitably. 
Conrail contends that its actions in amending the Plan were 
not those of a fiduciary under ERISA. 
 
ERISA imposes fiduciary duties in the administration of 
plans which it governs. American Flint Glass Workers Union 
v. Beaumont Glass Co., 62 F.3d 574, 579 (3d Cir. 1995); 
Walling v. Brady, 125 F.3d 114, 118-19 (3d Cir. 1997). We 
have recognized, however, that ERISA permits employers to 
"wear `two hats'," one as plan administrator, the other as 
plan sponsor. Blaw Knox Retirement Income Plan v. White 
Consol. Indus., 998 F.2d 1185, 1189 (3d Cir. 1993), 
quoting, Payonk v. HMW Indus., Inc., 883 F.2d 221, 225 (3d 
Cir. 1989). Fiduciary duties attach to the actions of 
employers " `only when and to the extent' that they function 
in their capacity as plan administrators, not when they 
conduct business that is not regulated by ERISA." Id. 
 
Under ERISA, an employer has broad authority to amend 
a plan, Hughes Aircraft, 1999 WL 24546, at *5 (holding that 
where employer "makes a decision regarding the form or 
structure of the plan," ERISA's fiduciary duty requirement 
is not implicated). In amending a plan, the employer is 
acting as a settlor. Id.; Lockheed Corp. v. Spink, 517 U.S. 
882, 890 (1996). There are portions of ERISA which govern 
plan amendments; for example, under S 1054(g), an 
amendment may not decrease accrued benefits. However, 
as long as an amendment does not violate a specific 
provision of ERISA, "the act of amending a pension plan 
does not trigger ERISA's fiduciary provisions." See Hughes 
Aircraft, 1999 WL 24546, at *5. Thus, the mere fact that 
Conrail amended its Plan did not breach any fiduciary 
duties under ERISA. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. A "wasting trust" is recognized under common law as a trust that has 
had its purposes accomplished so that its continuation would frustrate 
the settlor's intent. See Hughes Aircraft Co. v. Jacobson, No. 97-1287, 
1999 WL 24546, at *9 (U.S. Jan. 25, 1999). 
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With regard to appellants' wasting trust argument, 
because ERISA is a "comprehensive and reticulated statute" 
and is "enormously complex and detailed," it should be 
supplemented by the common law only where ERISA does 
not address an issue. See Hughes Aircraft, 1999 WL 24546, 
at *6; Jordan v. Fed. Express Corp., 116 F.3d 1005, 1017- 
18 (3d Cir. 1997). Moreover, even if we were to invoke the 
common law, the Plan was not a wasting trust. The Plan 
itself provided for its termination and the distribution of its 
assets. The District Court found that the Plan could not be 
likened to a wasting trust because it was an active plan up 
until just six months prior to the filing of this suit. Thus, 
appellants' fiduciary duty arguments under their common 




For the reasons stated above, we will affirm the judgment 
of the District Court. 
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